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Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures 
JEFFREYS. BANKS California Institute of Technology 
I analyze the finite-voter version of the Groseclose and Snyder vote-buying model. I identify how the optim_~l coalitio~ ~ize varie.s ~ith the u~derlying p~ef erence parameters; derive necessary and sufficient 
condztwns for minimal ma1onty and universal coalztwns to form; and show that the necessary condition 
for minimal majorities found in Groseclose and Snyder is incorrect. 
A common feature of numerous rational choice theories of politics, such as the size principle of 
Riker (1962) or the stationary equilibria of 
Baron and Ferejohn (1989), is that minimal winning 
coalitions are likely to form. This prediction runs 
counter to the empirical regularity that such coalitions 
are rarely if ever observed (Browne 1993). To remedy 
this situation Groseclose and Snyder (1996) develop a 
model of competitive vote buying in which the equilib-
rium path of play, for certain parameter values, has one 
group bribing a supermajority of voters and the second 
group bribing no one; the supermajority votes in favor 
of the policy preferred by the former group, whereas a 
simple majority would have sufficed. The incentives 
underlying this apparently excessive vote buying are 
found in the sequential structure of the moves: One 
group bribes a sufficiently large number of voters at the 
first stage so as to prevent a successful bribe attack by 
its opponent at the second stage. That is, the pressure 
to build a supermajority coalition is driven by the 
"unseen" competitive response that would have oc-
curred had the first group attempted to secure only a 
bare majority. 
Most of the analysis in Groseclose and Snyder (1996) 
assumes a continuum of voters, which makes certain 
types of results easier to identify but others more 
difficult. In particular, their characterization of the 
optimal coalition size requires the stringent assumption 
that voter preferences are linearly related. This as-
sumption is also present in their one finite-voter result, 
on the optimality of minimal majority coalitions. I will 
consider only the finite-voter model and replace the 
linearity assumption with a bound on voter prefer-
ences. Using fairly elementary methods, I will generate 
a characterization of the optimal coalition size and 
identify how this size varies as the underlying parame-
ters of the model change. I show that the optimal 
coalition size is weakly increasing in the value voters 
place on the winning group's preferred alternative. 
That is, as voter preferences shift in favor of that 
alternative, the winning group does not decrease, and 
may actually increase, the number of voters bribed. I 
also show that the result of Groseclose and Snyder 
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(1996) on the optimality of minimal majorities is not 
correct. 
THE MODEL 
There are two alternatives (x and y), two interested 
parties (A and B), and a set N = { 1, ... , n} of voters, 
with n assumed odd. Party A prefers x to y and is 
willing to pay up to WA > 0 to see the former prevail; 
B prefers y to x and is willing to pay WB > 0. For each 
i EN, let V; E ffi denote the intensity of i's preference 
for voting for x over y, measured in money, and let v = 
(v 1, •.. , vn) denote a preference profile. Thus, voter 
preferences are defined by how they vote rather than 
by the alternative that prevails; V; > 0 means that i 
prefers x toy, and V; < 0 means that i prefers y to x. 
Since the voters are indistinguishable to A and B save 
for these preference intensities, without loss of gener-
ality I can restrict attention to preference profiles of 
the form v 1 2'. v 2 2'. · · · 2'. v n-
The sequence of decisions is as follows. Initially, A 
offers a bribe schedule, a = (a 1, ... , a 11 ) E ffi'~, after 
which B, with knowledge of a, offers a bribe schedule, 
b = (b 1, ... , b 11 ) E ffi':-. Alli EN vote for either x 
or y, and majority rule determines the outcome. Solv-
ing this game via backward induction, given bribe 
schedules (a, b), voter i will prefer to vote for x if a; + 
V; > b; and for y if a; + V; < b;; we assume that an 
indifferent i votes for y. Given bribe schedule a and a 
constraint WB, B seeks the least-cost majority to bribe. 
Since indifferent voters choose y, B need pay no more 
than a; + v; to secure the vote of i, and if this amount 
is nonpositive, she gets i's vote with no bribe at all. 
Thus, B solves 
min(;~ max{O, a; + v;} : I CI > n/2) 
as long as this amount is strictly less than WB; other-
wise, she chooses b = (0, ... , 0), that is, B bribes no 
one. Finally, A sets his bribe schedule so as to have x 
prevail in the least-cost manner (if affordable), taking 
into consideration B's predicted reaction. 
As do Groseclose and Snyder (1996), I restrict 
attention to situations in which WA is large enough 
relative to WB and v so that, in equilibrium, x prevails 
over y. For the latter to occur, the schedule selected by 
A must be such that for every majority coalition C, 
L;Ec max{O, a;+ v;} 2'. WB; I refer to bribe schedules 
satisfying these inequalities as unbeatable. Let U(v, 
WB) ~ ffi':- denote the set of unbeatable bribe sched-
677 
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ules, and for any schedule a let S (a) = 2:7 ~ 1 a; be the 
expenditure associated with a. The above assumption 
on WA, WB, and v is that there exists an unbeatable 
bribe schedule affordable for A; that is, a E U(v, WB) 
such that S(a) s WA- A then solves 
min{S(a) : a E U(v, Ws)}. (1) 
The set U(v, WB) is evidently closed, whereas the set 
{a E ln'!- : S(a) s S(a)} is compact. Their intersec-
tion, within which any solution to expression 1 must 
reside, is compact (and nonempty by a); and since S is 
continuous, a solution to expression 1 exists. 
Characterizing a solution to expression 1 is made 
easier by the following observation. For any a E ln'!-, 
let C(a) = {i E N : a; > O} denote the set of 
individuals who receive a bribe from A. Then one can 
show that there exists a solution a' to expression 1 in 
which a; + V; = aj + vj for all i, j E C(a'); that is, 
under schedule a' all voters bribed by A are equally 
expensive for B to bribe. The intuition is thatA has no 
incentive to bribe voters, which make them differen-
tially expensive for B to bribe, as B will simply ignore 
the higher cost voters in constructing a least-cost 
majority. Groseclose and Snyder (1996) refer to this as 
a leveling schedule; let U1(v, WB) i:;:::; U(v, WB) denote 
the set of unbeatable leveling schedules, that is, bribe 
schedules a E U(v, WB), such that a; + V; = aj + vj = 
t(a) for all i,j E C(a). The bribe a;= t(a) - V; made 
to i E C(a) can be thought of as the sum of two terms. 
The first (t(a)) is a positive "transfer" common among 
all members of C(a), and the second (-v;) can be 
positive or negative and is individual-specific. The 
latter term brings all the members of C( a) to being 
indifferent between x and y, absent any bribe from B; 
the former term represents the per-capita amount 
necessary to make C (a), together with any unbribed 
voters, unaffordable to B. 
To simplify the analysis further, I make the following 
pair of assumptions: 
Al: V(n+l)/2 < O; 
A2: v1 < 2Wsl(n + 1). 
One implication of Al is that in the absence of any 
bribesy will defeatx, so in equilibriumA must bribe at 
least one voter. In fact, A2 implies thatA must bribe at 
least a majority of voters; otherwise, B will have 
sufficient resources to bribe a majority of voters, and y 
will defeatx. A2 also implies that for all a E U1(v, WB) 
it must be that t(a) ;:::: 2WB/(n + l); otherwise, B can 
bribe a majority from the coalition C (a) itself and have 
y defeat x. More substantively, A2 says that B cares a 
great deal more about defeating x than any of the 
voters care about x prevailing. Propositions 2, 3, and 4 
of Groseclose and Snyder (1996) assume Al holds; A2 
is new. 
Foranya E ln'!- letk(a) = IC(a)I, and suppose a E 
U1(v, WB) is such that V; ;:::: vj and j E C(a) but i rt, 
C( a); that is, i is at least as favorable to x as is j, but j 
is bribed and i is not. Then, under A2, there exists a' E 
U1(v, WB) with S(a') s S(a), k(a') = k(a), and i E 
678 
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C(a'), butj rt, C(a') by simply swapping the roles of 
i andj: a;= t(a) - V;, aj = 0, and for all m $. {i, j}, 
a~ = am. 1 Repeating this logic, and recalling that v 1 
;:::: · · · ;:::: v11 , we see that for all a E U1(v, WB) there 
exists a' E U1(v, WB) such that S(a') s S(a) and 
C(a') = {l, ... , k(a)}, so we can without loss of 
generality restrict attention to schedules a by A, which 
bribe the first k( a) voters. Call these monotonic sched-
ules, and let U~(v, WB) i:;:::; U(v, WB) denote the set of 
unbeatable schedules that are both monotonic and 
leveling. 
Therefore, when A2 holds, 
min{S(a) : a E U(v, Ws)} 
= min{S(a) : a E U~(v, Ws)}. 
Because the constraint set in the latter is more man-
ageable than the constraint set in the former, I will 
focus on solving the latter optimization problem. 
For any a E U~1 (v, WB), the expenditure S(a) can 
be written 
S(a) = L a;= L [t(a) - v;] = k(a) · t(a) 
iEC(a) iEC(a) 
- L V;. 
i-s;k(a) 
Furthermore, the parameters k(a) and t(a) completely 
characterize any schedule a E U~(v, WB), so A's 
optimization problem can be reformulated as the 
choice of parameters k and t. That is, A now solves 
mink· t - 2: V; 
k,t i::=;k 
subject to the constraint that the induced schedule, call 
it a(k, t, v), lies in U~(v, WB)· This induced schedule 
is defined as a; = t - V; if i s k; a; = 0 otherwise. 
Using Al and A2, I can reformulate this as an uncon-
strained problem involving simply the choice of k, as 
follows. If a(k, t, v) is unbeatable, then by A2 we know 
that k;:::: (n + 1)/2, so by Al it must be that if a;(k, t, 
v) = 0, then V; < O; that is, all nonbribed voters prefer 
(in the absence of bribes) y to x. Therefore, B receives 
the votes of all i E {k + 1, ... , n} for "free." For a(k, 
t, v) to be unbeatable it must then be that B cannot 
afford to bribe the additional (n + 1)/2 - (n - k) = 
k - (n - 1)/2 voters needed to form a majority, or 
t · [k - (n - 1)/2] 2:: Ws. 
Solving this for equality gives the optimal transfer from 
A to members of C (a) { 1, ... , k}, conditional on 
k: 
Ws 
t(k, Ws) = k - (n - 1)/2. (2) 
Defining 
E(k, v, Ws) = k · t(k, Ws) - L V; (3) 
1 A2 guarantees that a; is nonnegative. 
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as the minimal "winning" expenditure conditional on k, 
A's problem now is to 
min{E(k, v, Ws) : k E {(n + 1)/2, ... , n}}. (4) 
k 
I assume that if there are multiple solutions to this 
problem, A selects the smallest solution. Modulo this 
adjustment, let k*(v, WB) denote the solution to 
expression 4. This solution implicitly generates a solu-
tion to expression 1 through expression 2 and the 
induced bribe schedule described above. 
Finally, recall that, by A2, k*(v, WB) must be at least 
(n + 1 )/2, so that by Al the only individuals who vote 
for x, A's preferred alternative, are those who are 
bribed by A; Groseclose and Snyder (1996) refer to this 
as a flooded coalition.2 The number of individuals 
voting for xis equal to k*(v, WB), the number bribed 
by A, and so results on k*(v, WB) are equivalently 
results on the size of the coalition voting for A's 
preferred alternative. In particular, a supermajority 
votes for A's preferred alternative if and only if a 
supermajority is bribed by A. Also, note that k* ( v, WB) 
identifies not only the size of A's optimal coalition but 
also a voter, namely, the voter who receives the largest 
bribe from A. 
RESULTS 
I begin with a characterization of k*(v, WB); for 
notational ease, in some of what follows I will suppress 
the dependence ofE andk* on v and WB. Because the 
number of possible values for k is finite, I cannot 
employ calculus techniques to identify k*, but a dis-
crete version of these techniques can be used. For all 
k E {(n + 1)/2, ... , n - 1}, define D..(k) = E(k + 
1) - E(k); that is, D..(k) is the difference in expendi-
tures from adding the (k + l)st voter to the coalition 
{1, ... , k}. If D..(k) < 0, then (since A is attempting 
to minimize expenditures) A has an incentive to add 
the (k + l)st voter to the coalition. Conversely, if 
D..(k) 2: 0, thenA does not want to add the (k + l)st 
voter (recall our tie-breaking rule in favor of smaller 
coalitions). This gives a sense of the local or "first-
order" effects of changing the coalition size. 
Next, suppose A(k) is increasing ink, which is simply 
the discrete version of the second-order condition that 
E(k) be convex ink. The following algorithm then can 
be used to identify k*: If A((n + 1)/2) 2: 0, then we 
know from D..(k) increasing that D..(k) > 0 for all larger 
values of k, and hence the optimal value of k is k* = 
(n + 1 )/2. If A( (n + 1 )/2) < 0, then we know that k* 
must be greater than ( n + 1 )/2, so we next solve for 
D..((n + 3)/2). If this term is nonnegative, then, again 
by A ( k) increasing, we have that k * = ( n + 3) /2; if the 
term is negative, then we next check (n + 5)/2; and so 
on. When A ( k) is increasing, we have the following 
implicit characterization of the optimal coalition size: 
2 The implication of adding A2 to what Groseclose and Snyder 
(1996) already assume is that nonflooded coalitions, which are at 
times optimal in their environment, are never optimal here. 
Vol. 94, No. 3 
* _ { (n + 1)12 if A((n + 1)12) 2: 0 
k - max{k : A(k - 1) < O} otherwise 
(5) 
Finally, I show that D..(k) is indeed increasing ink. 
From equations 2 and 3, 
[ (k+l)Ws l A(k) = k + 1 - (n - 1)/2 - . ~ V; 
r:sk+ 1 
- [ k - ~~ 1)/2 - ;~ V;l 
[ (k + 1) 
= Ws k + 1 - (n - 1)/2 
- k - (nk- 1)/2] - Vk+l 
- Ws(n - 1) 
2(k + 1 - (n - 1)/2)(k - (n - 1)/2) 
- Vk+l (6) 
= T(k, Ws) - Vk+l· (7) 
Treating k for the moment as a continuous variable, it 
is easily seen by differentiation that T(k, WB) is 
increasing ink. Furthermore, since v1 2: v2 2: · · · 2: 
vn, the second term, -vk+1' is nondecreasing in k. 
Hence, the discrete second-order condition holds, 
which implies the above local analysis is also global: 
Equation 5 defines the optimal coalition size. 
Although generating an explicit characterization of 
k* via equations 5 and 6 admittedly would be some-
what messy, the parameter values that give rise to the 
"corner" solutions, that is, k* equal to either (n + 1)/2 
or n, are straightforward to identify. We have that k* 
= (n + 1)/2 if and pnly if D..((n + 1)/2) 2: 0, and k* 
= n if and only if A ( n - 1) < 0; inserting the relevant 
values into T(k, WB), we obtain the following. 
PROPOSITION 1. (a) k*(v, WB) = (n + 1)/2 if and only if 
v(n+ 3);2 :5 -WB(n - 1)/4; (b) k*(v, WB) = nifand 
only if vn > -2WB/(n + 1). 
Therefore, to determine whether a minimal majority 
coalition is optimal, the only relevant part of the 
preference profile vis the ((n + 3)/2)st term, and the 
only relevant part for a universalistic coalition is the 
last term. Of course, if neither inequality in proposition 
1 holds, k*(v, WB) lies strictly between (n + 1)/2 and 
n; that is, the optimal coalition is a less-than-univer-
salistic supermajority. Note also that proposition l(b) 
identifies a lower-bound constraint on v symmetric to 
the upper-bound constraint imposed above. Whereas 
A2 requires no voter to prefer x over y by more than 
2WB/(n + 1), proposition l(b) says that if, in addition, 
no voter prefers y over x by more than 2 W Bl ( n + 1), 
then the optimal choice by A is to bribe all the voters. 
Proposition l(a) gives as an immediate consequence 
separate necessary and sufficient conditions for a min-
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imal majority to be optimal, based only on the prefer-
ence intensities of the "extreme" voters: 
COROLLARY 1. k*(v, WB) = (n + 1)/2 ifv1::::; -WB(n -
1)/4, andonlyifvn::::; -WB(n - 1)/4. 
In words, a sufficient condition for A to find it optimal 
to bribe a minimal majority of voters is that all voters 
find y significantly more attractive than x, whereas a 
necessary condition is that at least one voter finds this 
to be so.3 
Like proposition l(b), proposition 3.3 in Groseclose 
and Snyder (1996) provides a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a universalistic coalition to be optimal in 
the continuum model, but only under a linear restric-
tion on preference intensities (see below). Such an 
assumption is also made for their proposition 4 as to 
when minimal majorities are optimal; yet, since the 
concept of a minimal majority is not well defined with 
a continuum of voters, their result assumes a finite 
legislature and so is directly comparable to results here. 
Suppose voter preference intensities can be written 
V; = ex - 13[i - (n + 1)/2], 
with ex ::::; 0 and 13 2: 0. Proposition 4 in Groseclose and 
Snyder (1996) asserts that if k*(v, Ws) = (n + 1)/2, 
then it must be that Ws < (2.1)13. That is, as long as 
B is willing to spend more than twice the difference in 
preference intensity between "adjacent" voters, A must 
bribe a supermajority. But consider this example: n = 
7, Ws = 3, and V; = -5 for all i EN, which implies 
ex = - 5 and 13 = 0 in the above linear format. 
According to Groseclose and Snyder, k*(v, Ws) 
should be strictly greater than four, but this is not true. 
Because V; < 0 for all i E N, B gets all voters not 
bribed by A for free. If A bribes four voters, she must 
pay each 3 + 5 = 8 (so that B cannot afford to attract 
any one voter), giving a total payment of 32. IfA bribes 
five voters, the required bribe is 1.5 + 5 = 6.5 (so that 
B cannot attract any two), for a total payment of 32.5; 
similarly, the bribes to six and seven voters total 36 and 
40.25, respectively. Therefore, A's optimal strategy is to 
bribe precisely a minimal majority of four voters, which 
contradicts proposition 4 of Groseclose and Snyder. 
Furthermore, we know from proposition l(a) that this 
example is robust to (small) changes in the values of ex 
and 13; all that is needed is v 1 less than . 75 (so A2 holds) 
and v (n + 3 )12 less than -4.5 for the optimal coalition 
size to be a minimal majority. 
I next identify how the optimal coalition size varies 
with voter preference intensity. Given an arbitrary 
amount Ws and preference profile v', let k' = k*(v', 
Ws)· If k' = (n + 1)/2, then we know that k*(v, 
Ws) 2: k' for all v, so suppose k' > (n + 1)/2. From 
equation 5 we infer A(k' - 1, v', Ws) < 0, which from 
equations 6 and 7 is equivalent to vk' > T(k' - 1, 
Ws)· Now suppose the preference intensities change 
from v' to v, and vk' is such that vk' 2: vk'· Then, vk' > 
T(k' - 1, Ws), and hence A(k' - 1, v, Ws) < 0. But 
3 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that corollary 1 (which 
was in a previous draft) could be generalized to proposition l(a) 
(which was not). 
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from equation 5 it must be that k*(v, Ws) 2: k'. 
Therefore, I have proven the following. 
PROPOSITION 2. For all W B' if v and v' are such that vk' 2: 
v~,, where k' = k*(v', WB), then k*(v, WB) 2: k*(v', 
WB)· 
In words, if the preference intensity of the "marginal" 
bribed voter weakly increases, then the optimal coali-
tion size will weakly increase as well, regardless of any 
changes in the other voters' intensities. An equivalent 
statement in terms of bribes is this: The number of 
voters bribed by A weakly increases as the voter who 
receives the largest bribe finds A's preferred alterna-
tive, x, more attractive. 
The above argument can be turned around to gen-
erate a sufficient condition for the optimal coalition 
size to decrease weakly. As before, let k' = k* ( v', Ws); 
if k' = n, then clearly k*(v, Ws) ::::; k' for all v, so let 
k' < n. By equation 5 I infer A(k', v', Ws) 2: 0, or 
from equations 6 and 7 vk'+l::::; T(k', Ws)· Suppose v 
is such that vk'+l ::::; vk'+l· Then, vk'+l ::::; T(k', Ws), 
which implies by equation 6 that tl(k', v, Ws) 2: 0, and 
hence by equation 5 that k*(v, Ws) ::::; k'. Therefore, 
we have the following. 
PROPOSITION 3. For all WB, if v and v' are such that 
vk'+l ::::; v~'+v where k' = k*(v', WB), then k*(v, 
WB) ::::; k*(v', WB)· 
In words, if the preference intensity of the marginal 
nonbribed voter weakly decreases, then the optimal 
coalition size will weakly decrease as well, regardless of 
any changes in other voters' intensities. (Unlike prop-
osition 2, however, this voter cannot be identified from 
the bribes offered by A.) Combining propositions 2 and 
3, we see that if the preference intensities of the 
marginal bribed and nonbribed voters do not change, 
then the optimal coalition size also does not change. 
The logic of pr9positions 2 and 3 stems from the 
"convexity" of E and the subsequent ability to adopt a 
first-order approach in characterizing the optimal coa-
lition size. As with the traditional calculus technique, in 
the presence of such convexity, only "local" informa-
tion is relevant for generating comparative statics 
about how changes in v affect changes in E. Here, this 
local information is summarized by the preference 
intensities of the marginal bribed and nonbribed vot-
ers. 
Of course, in order to identify these voters (and so 
verify the conditions in either proposition) one needs 
to solve for the optimal coalition size, which as men-
tioned above might prove somewhat messy. Yet, both 
propositions give rise to a weaker, more global com-
parative statics result that does not require such a 
computation. Given two preference profiles v and v', 
write v 2: v' if V; 2: vj for all i E N. 
COROLLARY 2. For all WB, ifv 2: v' then k*(v, WB) 2: 
k*(v', WB). 
Thus, the number of voters bribed by A, and hence the 
size of A's optimal coalition, weakly increases as voters 
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find A's preferred alternative, x, more attractive.4 This 
result certainly has a counterintuitive feel, as one might 
expect just the opposite, namely, that as x becomes 
more attractive relative toy, fewer voters will need to 
be bribed. The latter may well be true in a one-party 
model, but in this caseA's optimal behavior is driven by 
the predicted competitive response of B. Thus, al-
though A's total expenditure will surely decrease as x 
becomes more attractive, the optimal way to allocate 
this lower amount is to spread it more widely among 
the voters. 
The logic of corollary 2, independent of its status as 
an implication of propositions 2 and 3, comes directly 
from the ability to restrict attention to leveling, mono-
tonic bribe schedules. From the former (leveling) we 
can write A's expenditure, conditional on bribing k 
voters, as an additively separable function of the trans-
fer necessary to fight off B and of voter preference 
intensities. Although this expenditure obviously de-
pends on the transfer, the change in the expenditure 
due to a change in voter preferences does not. And 
from the latter (monotonic) we know that asx becomes 
more attractive to the voters, the change in expenditure 
will be greater, the larger is k. That is, from equation 3, 
E(k, v', W8 ) - E(k, v, W8 ) = k · t(k, W8 ) - 2: vi 
- [ k · t(k, W8 ) - ;~ v;] = ;~ (v; - vi). 
This sum weakly increases in k when v :::::: v', since each 
of the terms in the sum is nonnegative. Let k' be 
optimal at v' and k < k', which implies that k is 
necessarily suboptimal. Then, in moving from v' to v, 
the expenditure on k' decreases by a greater amount 
than does the expenditure on k, so k remains subopti-
mal. This does not imply that k' is optimal at v, merely 
that if it is not optimal, then the new optimal size must 
be greater thank'. 
Two additional features of corollary 2 are worthy of 
comment. First, Groseclose and Snyder (1996) identify 
a similar comparative statics result in their continuum 
model; voters are indexed by a uniform distribution on 
[ -1/2, 1/2], and preference intensities are described by 
a nonincreasing and differentiable function v : [ -1/2, 
1/2] ~ lR. As in their proposition 4, however, they 
require v to be linear: v (z) = a - !3z, with 13 :::::: 0 and 
a :::::; 0. They then show that k* is nondecreasing in a, 
which is analogous to my corollary 2.5 Second, the 
result as stated requires each voter's preference for x 
over y, as measured by V;, to increase weakly. Yet, as 
mentioned above, voters are indistinguishable to A and 
B beyond these v;s. Even if some voters have V; 
4 The only requirement is that v1 2': v; for all i E {(n + 3)/2, ... , 
n}, as the first (n + 1 )/2 voters receive bribes regardless of 
preference intensities. 
5 Groseclose and Snyder (1996) also show that k* is decreasing in [3. 
Yet, although they state that "as f3 rises, the initial level of support in 
the legislature for x declines" (p. 310), which suggests a similar effect 
to that from a, this statement only holds for z E (0, 1/2]; for z E 
[ -1/2, 0), a rise in f3 leads to an increase in support for x. 
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decrease, as long as the new distribution of preference 
intensities is everywhere above that of the old, corol-
lary 2 will remain true. That is, as long as the highest 
value in v is greater than or equal to the highest value 
in v', the second-highest value in v is greater than or 
equal to the second-highest value in v', and so on, it 
will be the case that k*(v, WB) will be greater than or 
equal to k*(v', WB)· 
Finally, I show that A's optimal coalition size k* is 
monotonic in WB as well. Because A2 depends on WB, 
I need to add the assumption that V; :::::; 0 for all i. 
PROPOSITION 4. For all v, ifW8 > WB, then k*(v, W8 ) :::::: 
k*(v, WB)· 
Therefore, as B's willingness to pay increases, A tends 
to bribe a greater number of voters. The proof is 
similar to that for proposition 2. Let k' = k*(v, Wk). 
From equation 5 we know that d(k' - 1, v, Wk) < 0, 
so from equations 6 and 7, vk' > T(k' - 1, Wk). Since 
T is clearly decreasing in its second argument, W B > 
Wk implies vk' > T(k' - 1, WB), and d(k' - 1, v, 
WB) < 0, which by equation 5 implies k*(v, WB) :::::: k'. 
DISCUSSION 
The propositions and corollaries presented here give a 
fairly complete theoretical picture of supermajority 
bribery under certain assumptions, in particular, the 
preference restrictions embodied in Al and A2. These 
assumptions allow us to focus, without loss of general-
ity, on a relatively simple class of bribe schedules 
(monotonic and leveling) and translate A's optimiza-
tion problem into one with an attractive mathematical 
property (convexity). An open question is the extent to 
which my results survive the weakening of these as-
sumptions. For instance, without A2 there can exist 
voters who prefer x toy by such a great amount that A 
finds it optimal not to bribe them at all (see Figure 4 in 
Groseclose and Snyqer 1996), thereby adopting a non-
monotonic, although still leveling, schedule. A would 
essentially be working on two margins in moving 
through { 1, ... , n}, namely, when to start bribing and 
when to stop, in contrast to the one-margin analysis 
(when to stop) associated with monotonic schedules. 
This suggests that the corresponding analysis of A's 
optimal behavior will be considerably more intricate 
than that found here. 
6 Groseclose and Snyder (1996) obtain a similar result in their 
continuum model, without the linear restriction on preferences. 
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